Buchanan Salmon Fishing

Commercial Fishing for Wild Alaskan Salmon

When ‘enhancement’ Really Means Elimination

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I’ve spent November to April working on Alaska Board of Fish issues, proposals, and comments (again!) and I’m sick of it. We’ve been fighting the local aquaculture aggrandizement for SIXTEEN years. When I worked my first season on a salmon seiner in Resurrection Bay, there were 6 seiners working hard, from the 6am start until the wind blew too hard to make fishing worthwhile. Every day that we could as the salmon returned.

Now there’s one–that is ONE– boat working (not very hard) because the ONLY opportunity to fish is given to the aquaculture association.

But that’s not the worst of it. Nope. Here’s the worst: they killed off the early natural run and fucked up their man-made run, so the return is so bad that no one is catching salmon. Because they’ve been decimated.

I can’t wait for that weir to be removed and the aquaculture association, too. This is the year it should happen…any day now…

25 Years of Unmet Goals

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Although the document history of bad decisions goes back much further, let’s look at the last 25 years for Cook Inlet Aquaculture. The Phase II Cook Inlet Regional Salmon Enhancement Plan (2001/2006–2025) was designed to provide a 20-year “big picture” look at regional enhancement, focusing on infrastructure integration, habitat protection, and maximizing the value of the common property resource. This plan was written by Cook Inlet Aquaculture Association.

The following comparison highlights where results between 2001 and 2025 have aligned with Phase II goals and, more importantly, where significant gaps remain.

I. Goal: Significant Contribution to Common Property Fishery

  • The Goal: Phase II established a standard that a project provides a “significant contribution” to the salmon resource when the common property fishery (commercial, sport, personal use) achieves at least a 50% harvest rate of the total return.
  • Result (Goal Not Met): Over the last 15 years, this goal has frequently been unattainable due to the “Cost Recovery First” management priority.
    • Management Shift: Since 2009, CIAA has operated under plans to achieve cost recovery revenue goals before opening Special Harvest Areas (SHAs) to the commercial fleet.
    • Shortfalls: In many years (e.g., 2012, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019–2025), returns were insufficient to meet even the revenue goals, resulting in zero or minimal commercial common property harvest in areas like Resurrection Bay and Tutka Bay.

II. Goal: Financial Responsibility and Revenue Stability

  • The Goal: Maintain the highest standards of financial responsibility and establish a reliable revenue source that consistently covers project operating costs.
  • Result (Major Failure Point): The Association has faced extreme financial volatility and persistent cumulative losses.
    • Tutka Hatchery: Over a 12-year period (2014–2025), the program incurred a total loss of $6,630,689, with an average annual loss of $552,557.
    • Trail Lakes Hatchery: Incurred a 12-year total loss of $1,221,277.
    • Headquarters: HQ expenses, which are funded by the 2% Salmon Enhancement Tax (SET), saw a 12-year loss of $5,798,092 against tax revenue.
    • Recent Trends: Cost recovery goals have not been achieved in recent years (FY23, FY24, FY25).

III. Goal: Rehabilitate Self-Sustaining Stocks and Habitats

  • The Goal: Rehabilitate stocks decimated by invasive species and protect habitat to ensure natural salmon production.
  • Result (Mixed/Ongoing Challenge):
    • Susitna Drainage: Production was described as a “production disaster” in 2009. While CIAA has invested nearly $4.7 million in Susitna watershed assessments, efforts to restore sockeye have been hampered by invasive northern pike.
    • Shell Lake: Pike suppression efforts have been successful in reducing pike biomass (only 34 pike harvested in 2020), but sockeye fry gains have been “disappointing but not unexpected” due to low adult escapement.
    • Paint River: The fish ladder opened in 2010 after decades of delay. While natural colonization by coho, chum, and pink salmon is documented, the goal of developing a sustained commercial fishery there remains unfulfilled.

IV. Goal: Maintenance of Facilities and Infrastructure

  • The Goal: Maintain facilities and administrative practices to ensure safe, professional, and cost-effective performance.
  • Result (Goal Not Met – Infrastructure Closures):
    • Port Graham Hatchery: Despite a $2.8 million renovation in 2015, the facility faced persistent challenges with water and personnel. Operations were proposed for suspension in FY24 because of inconsistent performance and broodstock losses.
    • Eklutna Salmon Hatchery: Fish production was suspended in 1998, and despite evaluations to bring it back online, it remains mothballed, with current work limited to site maintenance and potential sale.

Issues at Trail Lakes Hatchery and Bear Lake

Trail Lakes Hatchery, which manages sockeye and coho programs, has experienced several setbacks due to BKD:

  • Sockeye Production and Survival: In 2011, Trail Lakes reported that sockeye salmon fry experienced significant mortalities after release due to recurring coldwater disease and BKD. More recently, in 2018, sockeye egg collection goals for Bear Lake were not met because returning broodstock displayed characteristics of BKD.
  • Coho Egg Culling: The coho program has also been affected. In 2011, 4,100 coho eggs from the Bear Lake stock had to be culled specifically due to BKD. This trend continued in 2012, where another 4,100 coho eggs were culled for the same reason.
  • Regulatory and Treatment Challenges: CIAA historically treated returning female broodstock with erythromycin (an antibiotic) to manage BKD. However, a change in regulatory requirements in 2018 temporarily prevented this treatment, contributing to the reduced egg collection that year. Approval to resume erythromycin treatment for all female broodstock was granted starting in 2019.